Camera network isolation

Your cameras on a network that goes nowhere.

Two network cards. The cameras live on one, with no gateway and no route out. People, alerts and updates reach OpenNVR on the other. Whatever the cameras' firmware tries, they reach OpenNVR and nothing else.

camera networkno gateway · no internetcameracameracameraOpenNVRrecords · AI · appsNIC 1NIC 2management networkoperatorsphone appSIEM · NASupdates, alertssealed, or via your firewall

Why the cameras are the weak point

An IP camera is a small Linux computer you cannot patch on your schedule, running firmware you cannot read, often built to reach its vendor's cloud. Many sit on the same network as everything else. The Mirai botnet was built from cameras like these, and covered-list vendors are restricted precisely because of what their devices could do on a network.

You cannot fix the firmware. You can decide what it is able to reach.

What two network cards buy you

A hacked camera stops at the camera

OpenNVR is the only machine on both networks, and the firewall rule the installer offers stops it forwarding between them. A compromised camera cannot reach the office LAN, the way Mirai-style malware spreads.

Cameras cannot phone home

The camera network has no gateway. Firmware backdoors, vendor cloud and P2P services, and covered-list cameras have nowhere to send anything, so you stop having to trust the firmware.

Cameras cannot see the login page

In dual-NIC mode the web interface and API listen only on the management card. A compromised camera cannot even probe them.

Remote viewing without exposing a camera

People watch through OpenNVR over RTSPS, HLS and WebRTC with TLS. The cameras' plaintext RTSP never leaves the camera network.

Each camera is pulled once

OpenNVR takes one stream from each camera and serves recording, detection and every viewer from it. Cheap cameras are not overwhelmed, and camera traffic stays off the office network.

The layout installers already know

NVRs with built-in PoE ports put cameras on a private network the same way. Here it is a PoE switch on card 1, with no managed switches or firewall rules to configure, plus an audit log and the choice to connect.

Segmentation an auditor recognises

Network segmentation is a core control in IEC 62443 (zones and conduits), NIST CSF 2.0 and CISA's guidance for operational technology, and the evidence pack records the firewall rules.

Isolate while you replace

Covered-list cameras under NDAA §889 have to be replaced, but until they are, they sit on a network that goes nowhere.

Sealed or connected

The management card can stay offline too, or reach the internet for remote viewing over your VPN, phone alerts and updates. Connecting it is a mode, not a downgrade: the camera side stays exactly as dark, the web interface stays on the management card, and cloud routes stay refused until an operator opts in.

Online, the one thing on site the internet can see is the OpenNVR box: keep it behind your firewall, reach it over a VPN, never port-forward it. What stays the same in both modes.

Connected mode

The edge sees. Your cloud decides.

With the management side online, OpenNVR can hand its results to the systems that run your business: a plate read to parking billing, an incident to the ticketing desk, footfall to the BI dashboard, a clip to evidence storage. The video, the models and the cameras stay on site; what leaves is what you chose.

Every one of these connections is outbound, from the box. Nothing on the internet has to connect in, no camera is involved, and each destination is declared, approved and logged, so sharing a result is a decision on record rather than a hole in the network.

Apps that call cloud APIs

An app reaches only the hosts its listing declared or an administrator allowed, through the egress proxy. Every refused call is logged and raised in the inbox. That makes an app the safe connector to your backend, a CRM, a ticketing system or a language model.

Alerts to anywhere

The Alert Notifier sends to ntfy, Telegram, Slack, Microsoft Teams, Pushover, Discord, Matrix, email and any webhook, flood-safe.

Streams to your servers

Push any camera to RTMP or SRT servers such as AntMedia, Wowza or a mobile app backend, several destinations per camera. Refused in offline mode, and every change is audited.

Cloud AI, opt-in

A cloud model is an explicit choice an operator makes and the audit log records. Under the default local_only policy, none is allowed.

Next: a ready-made cloud bridge that forwards the events you pick to webhooks, MQTT brokers and cloud event services, with signed payloads and buffering through outages. It is being designed in the open: read the RFC and tell us what you would connect.

Set it up

  1. 01

    Two network cards

    A two-port mini-PC, the reference appliance, or one port with tagged VLANs: the installer treats VLAN sub-interfaces as separate cards.

  2. 02

    Choose dual-NIC at install

    start.sh sees more than one network and asks how yours is set up. Name the camera card and the management card; the web interface binds to the management card.

  3. 03

    Accept the firewall rule

    The installer offers rules that drop forwarding between the two cards. It shows every command before asking for sudo, touches nothing else, and one script undoes it.

  4. 04

    Leave the camera card without a gateway

    Give it a static address on the camera subnet and no default route or DNS. On the Network tab, set the Camera LAN subnet to scan and the Uplink.

./start.sh                                   # choose dual-NIC when asked
./scripts/apply-camera-vlan-hardening.sh \
    --camera-iface eth0 --mgmt-iface eth1 --dry-run   # see the rules, then run without --dry-run
./scripts/revert-camera-vlan-hardening.sh    # undo

The reference appliance shows the full layout with camera, management and storage VLANs and every port the appliance exposes.

What it doesn't do

  • The forwarding rule is applied when you accept it at install; leaving the camera card without a gateway is part of setting up the network.
  • An automatic check at boot that the two networks never overlap is planned, not built.
  • The OpenNVR box is the one bridge between the networks, so it has to be kept hardened and updated.
  • It does not stop someone who plugs into the camera switch on site; locked racks and port security do.

Isolate the cameras you already have

Any ONVIF or RTSP camera, a box with two network cards, and an afternoon.